THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
The article presents Moore’s concept of the naturalistic fallacy, with particular reference to two interpretations of the term: According to the interpretation, the naturalistic fallacy consists in identifying the quality of „goodness” with any other qualities, while according to the second, naturalistic fallacy would consist in identifying „good” with the natural qualities. Further, distinction is made between the naturalistic fallacy and its consequences which are sometimes confused with the fallacy itself by some authors.
The above consequences of the naturalist fallacy have further been classified to fall under the following heads; consequences in respect of definition (fallacy in definition), consequences in justification (fallacy in justification), and lastly, consequences as regards the object of ethics (fallacy in understanding the object et ethics).
The second part of the article deals with some of the estimates of Moore’s concept of the naturalistic fallacy, especially with those by Frankena, Pepper and Rice.