Husserlowska krytyka psychologizmu w aksjologii

Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz

Husserl’s Critique of Psychologism in Axiology

Husserl’s contribution to the investigation of problems concerning the epistemological and ontological status of value resulted in the creation of a new well defined solution. The starting point of this conception was the refutation of sensualistic psychologism. By granting to emotional acts possession of content which points to intentional objects Husserl revealed their epistemological function and ability to objectivise. The new interpretation of emotions attributing existence not only to affective inner states of the self but also to conscious acts that transcend beyond the self introduced a conception of value conceived as an objective correlate of emotions. Values may consequently be said to have been the universe of the objects whose existence was not determined by individual psychological emotions. This meant that Husserl’s professed axiological objectivism. By assigning objective character to value Husserl outlined a new field of investigation that may be called ontology of value. It concerned both problems of existence and problems of qualitative and structural characteristics of value.

Pobierz