ON LOGICAL VALUE OF EVALUATIVE PROPOSITIONS
This article is a polemic with the article by Marian Przełęcki, O pewnych filozoficznych konsekwencjach semantycznej definicji prawdy (On certain philosophical consequences of the semantic definition of truth) published by “Studia Filozoficzne” 6, 1973. Przełęcki claimed that certain evaluative propositions have a logical value by virtue of containing evaluative predicates which are commonly understood. The functioning of these predicates in natural languages makes it possible to identify their denotation in these languages, and thus it is possible to assign logical values to the propositions that predicate about different elements of the world their values in all cases when these elements do not fall into the range of vagueness of the predicates used. The authors of the polemic points out that the propositions analysed by Przełęcki are in fact descriptive and not normative because their logical value is determined by a common understanding of the evaluative predicates which they contain. These propositions do not say what is morally good, but, what is commonly believed to be morally good. Consequently, the problem of logical value of evaluative propositions has not been settled in Przełęcki’s article, while the ascription of logical values to propositions belonging to descriptive ethics, which is the real subject matter of the article, hardly poses any questions. The authors of this polemic contend that it is not possible to settle the problem of logical value of evaluative propositions without an analysis of the meaning of evaluative predicates.