ALEXIUS MEINONG’S THEORY OF VALUES
The article discusses Meinong’s theory of values in its later version as laid down in his studies Über emotionale Präsentation and Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie. His early psychological works are omitted. The principal purpose aim of the article is to show that Meinong’s axiology was essentially antipsychological in its character. For the philosophical foundation of his theory of values Meinong took the theory of object which furnishes a general solution of the question of relations between emotional experience, its content and its object. The intentional interpretation of feelings as emotional experiences relating to objects suggested to Meinong a new approach to values – to treat them as correlates of those experiences.
The author focuses her attention on the analysis of the structure of valuating emotional experiences and on describing values as their objects. Special attention is paid to the internal structure of values and on their supervenience. The question of objectiveness and absolute character of values is discussed. The structural correspondence of valuating experiences and values is shown, as is the problem of the relation between emotion and reason, between valuation and cognition. The author suggests the term emotional semi-intuitionism as most adequately describing Meinong’s theory. The kinship of Meinong’s theory of values and Max Scheler’s and Nicolai Hartmann’s axiological ideas is shown.