Factual Premises of Normative Utterances
The article draws attention to the fact that normative utterances do not describe fragments of the world but due to the fact that they are formulated in certain norm-giving acts they are symptoms of some concurring phenomena. It is quite natural that hearing norms which are proposed by other people we think of them as forms of rational behaviour which are determined by the knowledge and the drives of the people who produce them. This assumption suggests that the fact of enactment of such-and-such a norm is determined by knowledge of the person who proposes the norm. Hence, normative utterances may be considered, without running the risk of a serious fault, symptoms of certain state of affairs or, at least, symptoms of certain conceptions that the norm giver has concerning the states of affairs.
The analysis of interrogative utterances undertaken by the Polish logicians: K. Ajdukiewicz, J. Giedymin, T. Kubiński, who sought factual premises of questions, can be generalized and referred to the problem of factual circumstances surrounding normative utterances. In fact, questions can be considered to be a particular type of normative utterances, namely, the utterances requiring a specific linguistic behaviour. The article concentrates on surveying different types of premises that are implied by the fact that certain norms are given kind by a legislator which is presumed to be rational.
It is finally observed that enactment of legal norms and wide acceptance of certain moral norms are also symptoms of certain social relationships and facts.