Egoism and animal rights
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.613Keywords:
etyka, wegetarianizm, cierpienie, wołowina, drób, prawa zwierzątAbstract
Jan Narveson has recently suggested that “rational egoism” might provide a defensible moral perspective that would put animals out of the reach of morality without denying that they are capable of suffering. I argue that rational egoism provides a principled indifference to the fate of animals at high cost: the possibility of principled indifference to the fate of „marginal humans”.
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