Moral Interpretation: virtue ethics and social psychology

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.1340

Keywords:

virtue ethics, moral interpretation, social psychology

Abstract

The goal of the paper is to answer the question what does the process of Moral Interpretation (MI) look like. The main point of reference is the idea of MI as proposed by De Caro and Vaccarezza (De Caro, Vaccarezza, 2020). The article critically analyses their proposition and modifies it. The modified version is based on the bottom-up approach and findings of modern social psychology and doesn’t contain aristotelian presuppositions.  I will argue that MI can be explained as a process of attributing to someone moral dispositions, which is crucial to making predictions about someone’s behaviour in the future. As a consequence, MI is a fundamental part of human cognition, which is necessary to function in society.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Wiktoria Kąkol, Uniwersytet Gdański

Student of psychology at University of Gdańsk, participant of research project Tertium datur. Emotionalism - Towards a New Position in Metaethics.

References

Abele, A., Wojciszke, B. 2014. Communal and Agentic Content in Social Cognition: A Dual Perspective Model, “Advances in Experimental Social Psychology”, 50, 198-255 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-800284-1.00004-7

Carlston, D.E., Skowronski, J.J. 1994. Savings in the re-learning of trait information as evidence for spontaneous trait generation. “Journal of Personality and Social Psychology”, 66, 840–856 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.840

Davidson, D. 2001. Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Clarendon Press, Oxford DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246297.001.0001

Davidson, D. 1973. Radical Interpretation. Dialectica, 27(3-4), 313–328 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1973.tb00623.x

De Caro, M., Vaccarezza, M.S.. 2020. Morality and Interpretation: the Principle of Phronetic Charity, „Ethical Theory and Moral Practice”, 23 (3), 295-307 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10054-2

Cooper, J.M. 1998. The Unity of Virtue, „Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation” 15, 233–274. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500003149

Navarini, C., Indracollo, A., Brunetti, R. 2021. Practical Wisdom and Generalization: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation on the Effects of Limited Information, [in:] De Caro M., Vaccarezza M. S. (ed.), Practical Wisdom. Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, Routledge, New York, 114-137

Ross, L. 1977. The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, “Advances in Experimental Social Psychology”, 10, 173-220 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60357-3

Szutta, N. 2017. Czy istnieje coś, co zwiemy moralnym charakterem i cnotą?, Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin DOI: https://doi.org/10.52097/acapress.9788362475605

Uleman, J.S., Newman, L.S., Moskowitz, G.B. 1996. People as flexible interpreters: Evidence and issues from a spontaneous trait inference, “Advances in Experimental Social Psychology”, 28, 211–279 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60239-7

Wojciszke, B. 2011. Psychologia społeczna, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar

Published

2023-07-26

How to Cite

Kąkol, Wiktoria. 2023. “Moral Interpretation: Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology”. Etyka, July. Warsaw, Poland. https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.1340.

Issue

Section

Papers

Funding data