On the Predation Argument

Authors

  • Sławomir Mijas Uniwersytet Warszawski

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/17

Keywords:

animal ethics, predation argument, moral considerability, moral agency

Abstract

In this paper, I will give a philosophical analysis and defence of the seemingly naive Predation Argument (PA) that since some non-human animals eat other animals, there can be nothing morally wrong with eating meat. I offer a non-trivial formulation of PA based on premises with which a morally-motivated vegan (against whom PA is aimed) would most likely agree and defend these premises against possible objections. Not only does PA turn out to be a valid argument, but from the analysis of it we learn two things. First, we learn that the distinction between moral subjects and moral agents is not as strict as it is usually assumed. Second, we learn that the morality of eating animals does not come down to the morality
of killing them.

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Author Biography

Sławomir Mijas, Uniwersytet Warszawski

Sławomir Mijas is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw (Epistemology Division). His areas of interest include epistemology, normative ethics (especially virtue ethics), and experimental philosophy.

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Published

2019-09-30

How to Cite

Mijas, Sławomir. 2019. “On the Predation Argument”. Etyka 56 (September). Warsaw, Poland:105–119. https://doi.org/10.14394/17.

Issue

Vol. 56 (2018)

Section

Papers

License

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