The (un)consciousness of animals and their moral status. How can one reconcile ethics with the philosophy of mind?

Abstract

Philosophers of mind are beginning to take an important part in the debate about the moral status of animals. However, some of the most promising contemporary theories of consciousness imply that animals cannot suffer like human beings. This claim is unacceptable for many scholars concerned about animal welfare. Moreover, it is equally troublesome for those ethicists who take the ability to suffer to be the basic requirement for granting a being a moral standing, because their moral intuitions seem to contradict the results of cognitive sciences. I propose to solve the problem by rejecting the idea of there being a necessary link between possessing moral status and the ability to suffer (understood in the standard way). Also, I present a proposal for how at least some of the intuitions based on empathy may be defended and become useful in the discussion about the moral status of animals.