The Value of (Non) Existence

Abstract

Some philosophers claim that we can harm or benefit people by creating them. This claim relies on the assumption that it is possible to compare a person’s actual state of well being with the level of well being that person would have had, had that person never existed. The aim of this paper is to examine whether such a comparative evaluation can be made in a meaningful, logical and metaphysi¬cally valid manner. I analyze the arguments presented by Nils Holtug and Melinda Roberts in support of the thesis that existence can be worse or better for a person than never existing. First, I discuss Holtug’s defense that refers to three classical theories of well being: the mental state theory, the preference theory (assuming the satisfaction account of preferences), and the objective list theory. I raise and defend several objections against his argumentation, including “the identifiability objection”, “the non existence of a value bearer objection”, “the incommensurability objection”, “the confusion of ‘no value’ with ‘zero value’ objection”, and “the violation of the logic of the “betterness/worseness” objection”. I conclude that a person cannot be worse off (or better off) created than she would have been had she not been created. Finally, I briefly discuss Holtug’s argument that appeals to the object satisfaction account of preference theory. I suggest that this way of defending the thesis that existence can be worse or better for a person than never existing is also not persuasive, because the unconstrained object satisfaction account of preferences is not a good candidate for a theory of well being.