Understanding the Other: Social Perspectivism and Its Implications for Ethics

Abstract

The paper examines Robert L. Selman’s path-breaking conception of social perspective taking (social “perspectivism” in Hugh Rosen’s terms) in context of corresponding philosophical traditions (phenomenology and philosophy of mind), including its implications for ethics. Perspective taking belongs to cognitive abilities whose growth is to be considered in terms of ontogenetic human development. The author advocates Selman’s concept of “autonomous interdependence,” i.e., a distinction between cognitive interactivism on the one hand and the ability to pass autonomous moral judgments as a moral agent on the other hand. Open-mindness does not expose us to the expansion by the others; being locked in one’s own mind may not necessarily protect us against such an expansion. Something different is true: the quality of interhuman relations highly depends on how we perceive and understand one another; also, intersubjective cognition has a significant impact on our own conduct.