Moral Interpretation: virtue ethics and social psychology
Keywords:
virtue ethics, moral interpretation, social psychologyAbstract
The goal of the paper is to answer the question what does the process of Moral Interpretation (MI) look like. The main point of reference is the idea of MI as proposed by De Caro and Vaccarezza (De Caro, Vaccarezza, 2020). The article critically analyses their proposition and modifies it. The modified version is based on the bottom-up approach and findings of modern social psychology and doesn’t contain aristotelian presuppositions. I will argue that MI can be explained as a process of attributing to someone moral dispositions, which is crucial to making predictions about someone’s behaviour in the future. As a consequence, MI is a fundamental part of human cognition, which is necessary to function in society.
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