Some remarks on the moral aspects of the paradoxes of nuclear deterrence

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.1352

Keywords:

nuclear deterrence, Wrongful Intentions Principle, ethics of war, Gregory S. Kavka, rationality, Principle of Double Effect, decision theory, intentionality

Abstract

The Special Situation of Deterrence (SSO) model developed by Gregory S. Kavka is described in this paper. The model is assessed within the context of normative decision theory. Beginning with an examination of a deterrence paradox arising from the model, various problem-solving methods are presented regarding the nature of the intentions, rationality, and morality of the actions of the agent involved in the SSO. I also present a proposed solution to the deterrence paradox, which is the subject of this article. In addition, I will discuss other factors that influence the ethical evaluation of actions and the adoption and maintenance of intentions by a rational agent who represents a deterrent state.

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Author Biography

Martyna Pustoszkin, Szkoła Doktorska Nauk Humanistycznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski

Graduated in Law and Philosophy at the College of Interdisciplinary Individual Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences (MISH) at the University of Warsaw. She is currently writing her doctoral thesis on ontology at the Doctoral School of Humanities at the University of Warsaw. Her research interests include the topics of personal identity and criteria of persistence in time. Professionally, she is associated with legal subjects.

References

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Published

2024-10-17

How to Cite

Pustoszkin, Martyna. 2024. “Some Remarks on the Moral Aspects of the Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence”. Etyka, October. Warsaw, Poland. https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.1352.

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Online First

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Papers

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