Attitudes and judgements

Authors

  • Simon Blackburn

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.326

Keywords:

filozofia, etyka, przyczynowość, epistemologia, logika

Abstract

The paper is an attempt to show how a theory of morality which sees moral judgements as essentially expressions of personal attitude, can nevertheless explain and justify the way in which morality seems objective, and authoritative. It explores the genesis of notions of improvement, and correctness, and truth, in moral matters, thus trying to explain our right to these concepts, which other theories, such as realism, take too much for granted.

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Published

1986-12-01

How to Cite

Blackburn, Simon. 1986. “Attitudes and Judgements”. Etyka 22 (December). Warsaw, Poland:105-31. https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.326.

Issue

Vol. 22 (1986)

Section

Papers

License

Works published in ETYKA are available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence (CC BY 4.0), which entails acknowledgement of authorship. Under this licence, Authors keep their copyrights and agree that their works can be used again legally for any purpose, including commercial ones, without the need to obtain previous consent of the Author or publisher. The articles can be downloaded, printed, copied and disseminated; under the condition that the authorship is indicated accordingly, together with the place of original publication. The Authors preserve their copyrights to the above-mentioned works without any limitation whatsoever.