Attitudes and judgements
Keywords:
filozofia, etyka, przyczynowość, epistemologia, logikaAbstract
The paper is an attempt to show how a theory of morality which sees moral judgements as essentially expressions of personal attitude, can nevertheless explain and justify the way in which morality seems objective, and authoritative. It explores the genesis of notions of improvement, and correctness, and truth, in moral matters, thus trying to explain our right to these concepts, which other theories, such as realism, take too much for granted.
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