On "the freedom of the will"
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.347Abstract
The author rejects Marek Witkowski’s conclusion to the effect that no one is morally responsible for anything. This conclusion is based on the implication “x is morally responsible à x’s will is free” and the claim “no one’s will is free” which is justified, in its turn, by pointing out that there are only two possibilities of how it comes about that one wants something: either one’s state is necessitated according to a certain law or it is coincidental, both the possibilities entailing, in Marek Witkowski’s opinion, the absence of the freedom of the will as he understands it.
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