The Moral Horizon of Practical Thought

Abstract

Insofar as we do not regard morality as utterly irrational, any moral theory must presuppose a theory of practical reasoning. Attempts at developing the latter, though, encounter serious problems; it appears that the results of deliberation cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of the criteria applied in assessments of theoretical thinking, such as the degree of certainty of the adopted premises or the formal correctness of an inference. If practical reflection is indeed always grounded in the non–rational basis of an individual’s intuitions and desires, there seems to be no hope for a universal ethical theory. This article is, on the one hand, an attempt at demonstrating that practical reflection is per se only partly rational, and a proposal for a way out of the resultant theoretical impasse, on the other; this is made possible, in my view, by a certain interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of virtue.