Passions and Good Emotions. A Defence of the Stoic Idea of Apathy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.443Keywords:
sokrates, cyceron, epiktet, chryzypAbstract
The article tries to defend the stoic idea of apathy against some typical objections which are formulated against it in ancient and contemporary philosophical debates. My defense of it relies on the correction of interpretative assumptions which are shared by the critics of stoic apathy. First, I discuss the assumption that the crucial stoic term pathe is coextensive with our modern notion of emotion. In the stoic theory of emotions, pathe refers to destructive irrational emotions, not to emotions in general. Secondly, the critics of apathy ignore the key role played in the stoic theory by the idea of good emotions (eupatheiai). In order to fill this gap, I present the main assumptions of that theory.
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