Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity

Abstract

The paper is devoted to very vividly discussed questions in contemporary metaethics — the normativity of morality and a possible naturalistic account of it. The author aims to show that normativity in ethics can be understood at least in three ways, the main criterion of which is the level of ‘stringency’ of morality. The author outlines three grades of normativity, which he calls: generic, motivational, and authoritative. Then, he analyzes the question, which grade of normativity morality has. In the third step, he considers the possibility of its naturalistic account. The result of investigation leads the author to the claim that morality has only the weakest, generic grade of normativity; and even if there cannot be a naturalistic account of more ‘stringent’ normativity, this would not refute naturalism.