„I’d Rather Not Be Than Live This Way”. On the Idea of Harm Based on Joel Feinberg’s Rational Preference
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.475Abstract
Can we harm a person by bringing her into the world with a congenital disease or disorder? This question has been discussed by lawyers and ethicists for years. The standard counterfactual concept of harm fails, when applied to reproductive choices, as it gives rise to the so called non-existence problem and the non-identity problem. The aim of this article is to present Joel Feinberg’s alternative theory of harm – harm based on rational preferability. It is argued that this account of harm is unaffected by the non-existence problem, but it is prone to other interpretational and theoretical problems, in particular it is unable to provide a satisfactory solution to the non-identity problem.
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