Kantian Consequentialism of D. Cummiskey and D. Parfit versus the Autonomy of the Subject

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.526

Keywords:

konsekwencjalizm, utylitaryzm, Immanuel kant, imperatyw kategoryczny, racjonalizm światopoglądowy

Abstract

The standard interpretation of Kantianism recognizes it as a form of deontology due to I. Kant who criticized consequentialism and defended the legitimacy of deontic constraints. Many of his followers share this belief claiming that Kantian ethics has to be a form of deontology. However, Kantian consequentialism is not self-contradictory position – at least for R.M. Hare, D. Cummiskey, S. Kagan or D. Parfit. In my article I present a way to reconcile Kantianism and consequentialism, focusing on theories of D. Cummiskey and D. Parfit. I consider the most common argument against Kantian consequentialism that it is not able to vindicate the idea of autonomy and dignity. I argue that consequentialism can accommodate autonomy if it means not J.S. Mill’s autonomy of persons but rather Kantian autonomy of principles.

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Published

2013-12-01

How to Cite

Saja, Krzysztof. 2013. “Kantian Consequentialism of D. Cummiskey and D. Parfit Versus the Autonomy of the Subject”. Etyka 46 (December). Warsaw, Poland:88-104. https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.526.

Issue

Vol. 46 (2013)

Section

Papers

License

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