On Indirectly Intended Consequences of Action and Relinquishment. G.E.M. Anscombe and the Spanish Thomists of XVI/XVII Century

Abstract

I present Anscombe’s diagnosis of two errors in action theory: (i) failing to distinguish intended and foreseen effects (consequentialism), and (ii) the idea that while doing a given thing you can shape your intention in any way you like. This shows that the task of action theory is to grasp the inclination of the will in case of a given action, the inclination which is neither determined by the very foresight of effects nor, with a given kind of action, can be shaped in any way you like. As an example of a treatment of the will which meets these conditions I present the distinction (in XVI/XVIIth century spanish thomism) of (a) directly intended, (b) indirectly intended and (c) only permitted effects of acts and ommission. The distinction between (b) and (c) is based on the existence of obligation to prevent a given effect in case of a given agent.