Indifference and non-acting as the objects of moral valuation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.643Keywords:
Arystoteles, utylitaryzm, Immanuel Kant, sylogizmAbstract
To evaluate non-acting involves more theoretical problems than to estimate actions. There is a full range of possible solutions of this question. The extreme ones are presented, on the one hand, by consequentialism that denies the difference between action and non-acting if their results are the same; and, on the other, by negative utilitarianism, that is based on the literal interpretation of the rule “Do not do the evil” that says nothing about non-acting. There is, of course, intermediary proposition held by moderated versions of absolutistic ethics and utilitarianism which, both, assert the responsibility for non-acting but differentiate it from the responsibility for actions.
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