Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.652

Keywords:

intuicjonizm, epistemologia, Arystoteles, utylitaryzm, Platon, teizm

Abstract

The author presents an interpretation and critique of Henry Sidgwick’s ethical intuitionism. It is shown that Sidgwick denies the views that we have some special ‘moral sense’, and that intuitions are indefeasible. The differences between perceptual, dogmatic, and philosophical intuitionism are teased out, and a modest case is made for a slightly amended form of the last.

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Published

2008-12-01

How to Cite

Crisp, Roger. 2008. “Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism”. Etyka 41 (December). Warsaw, Poland:90-109. https://doi.org/10.14394/etyka.652.

Issue

Vol. 41 (2008)

Section

Papers

License

Works published in ETYKA are available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence (CC BY 4.0), which entails acknowledgement of authorship. Under this licence, Authors keep their copyrights and agree that their works can be used again legally for any purpose, including commercial ones, without the need to obtain previous consent of the Author or publisher. The articles can be downloaded, printed, copied and disseminated; under the condition that the authorship is indicated accordingly, together with the place of original publication. The Authors preserve their copyrights to the above-mentioned works without any limitation whatsoever.